From Shale Gas to LNG Exports: The Prospects for North American LNG Exports
Susan L. SakmarVisiting Assistant ProfessorUniversity of Houston Law Center
While much has been written about shale gas being either an “energy game changer” or an environmental hazard, far less attention has been focused on whether the U.S. should export its newfound abundance of shale gas as liquefied natural gas (LNG) to foreign countries. This paper analyzes this key policy question in the context of briefs submitted to U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (hereinafter “DOE”) in respose to its request for comments on its “2012 LNG Export Study”.
I. Overview of the U.S. Regulatory Approval Process for U.S. LNG Exports
A. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) v. Non-FTA Countries
At the outset, it is important to note that under existing U.S. law, export applications to export to most free trade agreement (FTA) countries are deemed to be in the public interest and such applications are quickly authorized by the Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy (DOEDOE).
With the exception of the Republic of Korea and possibly Chile, most of the FTA countries are not likely to be significant importers of LNG so the real prize for a company is the authorization to export LNG to any country, which the DOE refers to as “non-FTA” countries. Applications for export authorization to non-FTA countries involve greater scrutiny and require a determination of whether the proposed exports are in the “public interest.”
B. The “Public Interest” Test and 1984 Policy Guidelines
In evaluating whether a proposed export is within the public interest, the DOE applies certain Policy Guidelines issued in 1984 that focus the analysis on:
C. The First Project To Receive Non-FTA Approval – Cheniere’s Sabine Pass
While the issue of LNG exports has only recently risen to the level of intense public interest and debate, this issue has actually been pending for over two years. On September 7, 2010, Cheniere Energy, through its subsidiary, Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC (Sabine Pass) filed an application seeking long-term, multi-contract authorization to export up to 16 million metric tons per annum (MTPA) of domestically produced LNG to any country with which the U.S. does not have a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
On May 20, 2011, following a review of the record, the DOEDOE authorized Sabine Pass to export LNG to non-FTA countries. DOE At the time the DOE issued the Order in the Sabine Pass case, there were only a few export applications pending and the issue of LNG exports had not yet attracted much attention. Nonetheless, in its Order, DOE acknowledged that the “cumulative impact of these export authorizations could pose a threat to the public interest” such that DOE is authorizedto take action should circumstances warrant it.
II. The Debate Over LNG Exports Heats Up
A. The November 2011 Senate Hearing
The debate over whether the U.S. should export LNG began to mount in late 2011 when concerns were raised that allowing LNG exports would lead to an increase in the domestic price of natural gas. Exports are one of many factors that can have a bearing on the price of domestic gas since they represent an additional source of demand. At the same time, and over the long run, an increase in demand also tends to increase supply. The extent to which the price of natural gas interacts with its supply and demand has been a cause of much speculation in the U.S., leading to a U.S. Senate hearing in November 2011 to address the issues raised by the possibility of U.S. LNG exports.
At the November 2011 Senate hearing, Chairman Bingaman noted in his opening remarks that the last time the Senate held a hearing on LNG was in 2005, when it was anticipated that the U.S. would need to import large quantities of LNG, whereas the current hearing was meant to discuss the role that LNG exports might play in the energy future of the U.S. There were two main objectives of the Senate hearing. The first was to understand the laws and regulations that govern LNG exports generally since those laws were put into place assuming the United States would be an importing country, not an exporting country.
The second objective was to understand how LNG exports might affect the domestic market for natural gas. While the implications of increased gas exports for U.S. job creation and balance of payments could be very positive, Chairman Bingaman also noted that U.S. energy security requires reliable and affordable energy prices, not just reliable supply. Since U.S. gas prices are considerably lower than prices than those in much of the world, Chairman Bingaman questioned how the U.S. could “ensure that our export policy is consistent with our continued ability to reap the benefits of our newfound abundance of natural gas?”
B. The Impact of U.S. LNG Exports on U.S. Natural Gas Prices
At the Senate Subcommittee hearing, several Senators expressed concern about the impact LNG exports could have on domestic natural gas prices, including U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) who noted the following:
"[I]t’s very understandable why North American natural gas producers would want to build LNG export terminals so they can sell natural gas to Asia and other overseas markets at four or five times the prices here. What’s less clear is how this is going to be beneficial for our businesses and our consumers who are going to have to compete with these prices?"
In response to questions about the price increase that DOE would find acceptable, the DOE acknowledged the analysis was complicated and when the DOE makes a public interest determination, it considers a range of factors such as the impact on jobs, balance of trade, and the impact on price. Since some of the factors are influenced by price itself, the DOE explicitly recognized the importance that price holds.
C. What Do The Pricing Studies Show?
In January 2012, the U.S. EIA released the first of two pricing studies analyzing the impact of U.S. LNG exports on the domestic energy market. As requested by the DOE, the EIA’s study reviewed the impact of specified scenarios of natural gas exports on U.S. energy markets, focusing on consumption, production, and prices. Assuming that levels of LNG exports would be either six billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d) or twelve Bcf/d, the U.S. EIA concluded that, “increased natural gas exports lead to higher domestic natural gas prices, increased domestic natural gas production, reduced domestic natural gas consumption, and increased natural gas imports from Canada via pipeline.” The precise amount of increased prices would depend on the level of exports and the rate of phasing in increased exports. For example, under the low-slow scenario, it is assumed that six Bcf/d of exports are phased in at a rate of one Bcf/d per year over six years. Under this scenario, the wellhead price impacts peak at about 14% ($0.70/Mcf) in 2022, but the wellhead price differential falls below 10% by about 2026. Although the impact of LNG exports varies depending on the assumptions about resource availability and economic growth, the basic assumption remains the same: “higher export levels would lead to higher prices, rapid increases in exports would lead to sharp price increases, and slower export increases would lead to slower but more lasting price increases.”
In contrast to the potentially severe impacts on price found in the EIA study, an independent assessment done by Deloitte MarketPoint LLC found that any price increase resulting from U.S. LNG exports would be quite minimal. In May 2012, the Brookings Institution released a report analyzing the various pricing studies that have been conducted so far on the impact of U.S. LNG exports on the domestic price of natural gas. As indicated by the Brookings analysis, while the exact pricing impact of U.S. LNG exports is open to debate, there is general consensus that LNG exports will lead to an increase in the domestic price of natural gas.
Table 1: Study-by-study comparison of the Average price Impact from 2015-2035 of 6 bcf/day of LNG exports (unless otherwise noted)
* Price impact figure for EIA study reflects the reference case, low-slow export scenario.
** The Navigant study did not analyze exports of 6 bcf/day.
*** Navigant (2010 and 2012) and ICF International studies are based on Henry Hub price.
III. The Issues Raised In The Comments in Response to the NERA Study
On December 5, 2012, the DOE released the study done by NERA Economic Consulting on the “Macroeconomic Impacts of LNG Exports from the United States,” (hereinafter “NERA Study” or “NERA Report”). The prospect of the U.S. becoming one of the world’s largest LNG exporters raises significant implications for the U.S. in terms of energy security, economic benefits, environmental impacts, and even potentially issues of intergenerational equity since natural gas is an “exhaustible” or finite natural resource. The comments can be broken down into the following three main categories with a summary of some of the key arguments provided for background and context:
A. LNG Exporters and Energy Companies Support Unlimited LNG Exports
A number of comments submitted by LNG exporters and energy companies expressed wide ranging support for the NERA Study which was generally viewed as favorable for LNG exports. In particular, LNG exporters as well as a number of other energy companies and policy makers from shale producing states and/or states where proposed LNG export projects are pending voiced support for the NERA Study. For example, Cheniere Energy endorsed the conclusions reached in the NERA Study that under all scenarios considered, the United States will benefit economically from the international sale of LNG. (Cheniere at p. 2) Cheniere believes that trade in natural gas is no different than the trade of other goods and that by removing barriers to trade, the U.S. economy will benefit. (Cheniere at p. 2) The American Petroleum Institute (API) also submitted a comment in support of the findings of the NERA Study and arguing for the expeditious approval of the pending LNG export projects. According to the API, the evidence in the NERA Study “overwhelmingly showed that LNG exports will create jobs, increase GDP, contribute to an improvement in the trade deficit and increase the overall welfare of Americans – in other words, the evidence shows that LNG exports are in the public interest.” (API at p. 15). The API also noted that the evidence was such that the opponents of exports cannot meet their burden of proof necessary to overcome the rebuttable presumption in favor of exports. (API at p. 15)
1. International Trade Issues and WTO Arguments
A number of comments in support of LNG exports raised issues related to free trade with some noting that the DOE’s failure to approve LNG exports would give rise to a violation of the U.S.’s obligations under the WTO. Whether this is legally sound is open to debate but the DOE rejected similar arguments in the Sabine Pass case. In its application, Sabine Pass requested the DOE to review its request to export LNG to WTO countries under the same standard of review applicable to FTA countries.
In making its request, Sabine Pass contended that U.S. trade policy, as well as U.S. obligations under the WTO, required the “automatic export authorization process” applicable for export of LNG to FTA Countries and therefore sought DOE’s immediate approval to export LNG to WTO countries. Despite Sabine Pass’s extensive briefing of the trade issues, on October 21, 2010 the DOE issued an opinion and ordered that its application be reviewed under section 3(a) of the NGA, which requires the “public interest” analysis.
It should also be noted that while most proponents of free trade assume that the WTO provisions would apply to trade in energy, there has never, in fact, been a formal Trade Round launched on Energy Trade.
2. Environmental Groups and Members of the General Public Oppose LNG Exports Since It Will Lead to More Shale Gas Development and “Fracking”
The majority of the comments submitted came from environmental organizations and the general public. These groups expressed concerns that LNG exports would actually weaken the U.S. “economy as a whole, while transferring wealth from the poor and middle class to a small group of wealthy corporations that own natural gas resources. This wealth transfer comes along with significant structural economic costs caused by increased gas production, which destabilizes regional economies and leave behind a legacy of environmental damage.”
In general, the environmental opposition to LNG exports stems from more generalized opposition to shale gas development on the basis that “intensifying gas production for export will also intensify the air and water pollution problems, public health threats, and ecological disruption associated with gas production.” According to these groups, the DOE would be acting “arbitrarily and capriciously” if it relied on the NERA report because the NERA report failed to consider the environmental impacts, and associated economic costs of gas production.
In particular, the Sierra Club’s opposition to LNG exports coincides with intensified efforts to ensure that as coal fired power plants are retired they are not replaced with natural gas power plants. To that end, the Sierra Club has launched a “Beyond Gas” campaign that represents a significant expansion of the group’s on-going efforts against other major fossil fuels and is modeled after the decade-old “Beyond Coal” campaign that sought to phase out coal fired power plants.
For now, it remains to be seen whether the environmental opposition to U.S. LNG exports will intensify. However, some reports have acknowledged that since the case for U.S. LNG exports depends on the continued development of shale gas, the public’s concerns over the environmental impacts of shale gas development must be resolved.
3. Industrial Users of Natural Gas Argue Against “Unfettered” LNG Exports
The middle ground or most balanced approach appears to come from industrial users of natural gas, such as Alcoa, Dow Chemical, and the Industrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA). These companies do not appear to oppose LNG exports in principal but rather, caution against allowing “unfettered” LNG exports, which might lead to unintended price spikes or shocks. For example, in its comments, Alcoa, an aluminum manufacturing company that employs 26,000 people in the U.S. contends that it “favors a balanced approach to energy policy, developing domestic and international markets while avoiding distortions that increase domestic price and/or price volatility.”
These companies have raised numerous issues and deficiencies with the NERA study including, but not limited to:
In addition to the number of defects alleged in the NERA Report, Dow also argues that neither the NERA Report, nor any other macroeconomic assessment of LNG exports, can address the range of public policy issues that should be considered by the DOE in deciding the public interest. (Dow at p. 4). Accordingly, and in light of the significant public policy issue raised, Dow argues that the DOE should conduct a full administrative proceeding, including public hearings, from which the government will then be able to establish the appropriate criteria for the making the statutorily required public interest determination. (Dow at p. 42)
B. Application of The Public Interest Test
In evaluating whether to approve additional export applications, the DOE is bound by Section 3(a) of the Natural Gas Act, the 1984 Policy Guidelines, and other factors to the extent they are shown to be relevant to a public interest determination
In considering the totality of the comments submitted by the public in response to the NERA Study, it is evident that the public at large is divided as to whether or not LNG exports are in the “public’s interest.” Of the many concerns raised, there are two primary concerns that stand out.
The first is the potential impact unfettered LNG exports will have on the domestic price of gas to the possible detriment of manufacturers planning investments based on low priced natural gas and domestic consumers of natural gas. This concern has been raised by a number of key policy makers including Senator Wyden and Congressman Markey, both of whom have suggested that the NERA Study is flawed because it understates demand expected to come from a number of sources including (1) industrial users and the manufacturing industry, (2) the power generation industry as natural gas for power generation replaces coal for power generation, and (3) increased demand for natural gas as a transportation fuel.
The second primary concern is the uncertainty surrounding the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing and increased shale gas development. These concerns have been raised by a number of environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club. I also note that the DOE has previously taken administrative notice of the ongoing EPA Hydraulic Fracturing Study, which is investigating the possible impacts of hydraulic fracturing on drinking water resources.
In addition to these two key concerns, it should be noted that the U.S. has very little experience with LNG exports, which only includes one small export facility, Kenai LNG, in Alaska, and a history of getting natural gas wrong. For example, just a mere five years ago, it was expected that the U.S. would be the world’s largest LNG importers with policy makers arguing in favor of building many more LNG import terminals. Those predictions turned out to be wrong and resulting in U.S. import terminals sitting largely idle until the prospect for U.S. LNG exports was envisioned.
IV. Current Status of LNG Export Applications
A. FTA Projects
The DOE has already approved approximately 27 Bcf/d of LNG exports to FTA countries, or approximately 196 mtpa. While most of these projects may not proceed to final investment decision (FID) on the basis of FTA approval alone, some companies have indicated they would consider moving a project forward on FTA approval only so it is possible that some of these projects will proceed regardless of non-FTA approval.
B. Status of Non-FTA Applications
Whereas only a few export applications were pending back in May 2011 when the DOE issued its Order in the Sabine Pass Liquefaction case, there are now numerous applications pending with proposed exports to non-FTA countries of 24.80 Bcf/d, or approximately 180 million metric tons per annum (mtpa). Qatar, currently the world’s largest LNG exporter achieved what was widely viewed as a milestone in the LNG industry of achieving production capacity of 77 mtpa.
The DOE has indicated it will process applications in the order in which applicants have received approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to use the FERC pre-filing process, followed by other pending DOE applications. After much anticipation, the DOE resumed the approval process in May 2013 and authorized Freeport LNG Expansion, L.P. and FLNG Liquefaction, LLC (Freeport) to export LNG to non-FTA countries. Subject to environmental review and final regulatory approval, Freeport is conditionally authorized to export up to 1.4 (Bcf/d) for a period of 20 years. 
In August 2013, the DOE announced it had approved the third US LNG export project by granting Lake Charles Exports LLC conditional authorization to ship up to 2 Bcf/d of LNG to countries with which the US does not have a free trade agreement, so-called “non-FTA” countries. The Lake Charles approval was sooner than many had expected but not soon enough for some US policy makers and industry leaders that have been pushing the White House to pick up the pace on approvals, claiming that the “window of opportunity” for US LNG exports was closing. U.S. Sen. Lisa Murkowski, R-Alaska, has been a vocal supporter of energy exports as a way to boost a struggling US economy. Just a day before the Lake Charles approval, Sen. Murkowski, the ranking member of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, released a white paper outlining her support for exporting LNG to non-FTA countries.
Pending Long-Term Applications to Export LNG to Non-FTA Countries In Order DOE Will Process
Table 2: Current Status of Pending LNG Export Applications – Listed in Order DOE will Commence Processing
DOE will begin processing all long-term applicants to export LNG to non-FTA countries in the following order:
1. All pending DOE applications where the applicant has received approval (either on or before December 5, 2012) from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to use the FERC pre-filing process, in the order the DOE application was received.
2. Pending DOE applications in which the applicant did not receive approval (either on or before December 5, 2012) from FERC to use the FERC pre-filing process, in the order the DOE application was received.
3. Future DOE applications, in the order the DOE applications are received.
* Susan L. Sakmar, DOE Approves Second US LNG Export Project to Non-FTA Countries, Natural Gas Europe (May 17, 2013), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/us-doe-freeport-lng-export-project.
** Susan L. Sakmar, DOE Approves Third US LNG Export Project to Non-FTA Countries, Natural Gas Europe (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/doe-approves-third-us-lng-export-project.
*** Susan L. Sakmar, DOE Approves Fourth US LNG Export Project, Natural Gas Europe (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/doe-approves-dominion-cove-lng-export.
V. Conclusion - The DOE will contine to proceed with caution
With the latest approval of Lake Charles, the DOE still has about 20 pending applications export LNG to non-FTA countries and still has not set out a timeline for additional approvals. For now, DOE has indicated it will review each application on a case-by-case basis while giving preference to companies that are already moving through the FERC pre-filing process.
Heeding calls by a group of industrial users of natural gas and manufactures represented by America’s Energy Advantage the DOE indicated that it will continue to take a “measured approach” in reviewing the other pending applications and will continue to assess the cumulative impacts of each succeeding request for export authorization on the public interest with due regard to the effect on domestic natural gas supply and demand fundamentals. In keeping with the performance of its statutory responsibilities, DOE has the authority to attach appropriate and necessary terms and conditions to authorizations. For example, both the Freeport and Lake Charles projects had applied for a 25-year export period but the DOE reduced this to a 20-year term beginning from the date of first exports in part because the LNG Export Study contained projections over a 20-year period.
Going forward, it is likely that the DOE will continue to proceed with caution in approving additional export projects for the following reasons the DOE has articulated:
(1) The LNG Export Study, like any study based on assumptions and economic projections, is inherently limited in its predictive accuracy;
(2) Applications to export significant quantities of domestically produced LNG are a new phenomena with uncertain impacts; and
(3) The market for natural gas has experienced rapid reversals in the past and is again changing rapidly due to economic, technological, and regulatory developments.
In short, the DOE has recognized that caution is in order since “The market of the future very likely will not resemble the market of today.”
 Professor Sakmar is licensed to practice law in California and has over 20 years of experience working in a variety of legal, corporate and academic settings. Author of LNG, Energy for the 21st Century: Opportunities and Challenges for Liquefied Natural Gas (2013), she currently is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Houston Law Center where she teaches a course on Shale Gas & LNG. firstname.lastname@example.org.
 According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) Annual Energy Outlook 2012, U.S. natural gas production is expected to increase almost twenty-nine percent from 21.6 trillion cubic feet in 2010 to 27.9 trillion cubic feet in 2035. Almost all of the increase is due to the projected growth in shale gas production, which is expected to account for forty-nine percent of total U.S. natural gas production in 2035, more than double its twenty-three percent share in 2010.
 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2006).
 Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Panama
 Policy Guidelines and Delegation Orders Relating to the Regulation of Imported Natural Gas, 49 Fed. Reg. 6,684 (Feb. 22, 1984).
 Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC – FE Dkt. No. 10-111-LNG, available at http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation.
 Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC, FE Docket No. 10-111-LNG, Opinion and Order Conditionally Granting Long-Term Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas From Sabine Pass LNG Terminal to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations, DOE Order No. 2961, May 20, 2011 (Hereinafter “Sabine Pass DOE Order No. 2961”)
 Susan L. Sakmar, Politics and US LNG Export Project Heat Up, Natural Gas & Electricity Journal, Sept. 18, 2012, http://www.naturalgaselectricitynews.com/sample-articles/politics-and-us-lng-export-projects-heat-up.aspx
 See, e.g., Benjamin Lefebvre, Should the U.S. Export Natural Gas?, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 2012, at R10, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444226904577561300198957854.html (featuring debate on potential price increases by two energy analysts).
 LNG Export Approvals, Market Impact: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Energy and Natural Res. (Nov. 8, 2011) (opening statement of Chairman Bingaman), available at http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/democratic-news?ID=242b6b91-cb66-49f5-a4bb-8b2dc54d89e1
 Senator Wyden has also submitted a comment (#20) to the NERA Study.
 The Department of Energy’s Role in Liquefied Natural Gas Export Applications: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Energy and Natural Res. (Nov. 8, 2011) (statement of Christopher Smith, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Oil and Natural Gas Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=58b62501-e2e1-40aa-b024-8e45ab3d4569.
 U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Effect of Increased Natural Gas Exports on Domestic Energy Markets (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe_lng.pdf.
 Id. at 6.
 Id. at 9.
 Deloitte MarketPoint LLC and the Deloitte Ctr. for Energy Solutions, Made in America: The economic impact of LNG exports from the United States (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/Energy_us_er/us_er_MadeinAmerica_LNGPaper_122011.pdf
 Charles Ebinger et al., Brookings Institution Energy Security Initiative, Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas (May, 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2012/05/02-lng-exports-ebinger.
 Comment # 118, Patricia Outtim on behalf of Charif Souki, Chairman and CEO, Cheniere Energy, Inc.
 Comment # 134, Erik Milito, Group Director, Upstream & Industry Operations, American Petroleum Institute (API). See also, Comment # 95, Bill Cooper, President, The Center for Liquefied Natural Gas.
 Application at 2-3.
 Application at 23-29.
 Opinion and Order at 8.
 Comment # 189, Craig Segall, Staff Attorney, Sierra Club Environmental Law Program. The Comments filed on behalf of the Sierra Club and its members are listed as representative of the comments filed in general from environmental groups and individuals opposed to LNG exports. Because the Sierra Club submitted comments on behalf of thousands of its members (see #393 – Sierra Club submits 77,044 comments on behalf of 77,044 individuals), the Sierra Club brief is used as a representative illustration of the comments submitted by environmental groups and individuals.
 Id. at p. 2.
 Id., citing 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A) and Motor Vehicle Mftrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
 Amy Harder, War Over Natural Gas About to Escalate, Nat’l Journal, May 3, 2012, http://www.nationaljournal.com/energy-report/war-over-natural-gas-about-to-escalate-20120503.
 Most recently, there is at least some indication that the opposition to LNG exports is intensifying with a number of groups urging the administration to carefully consider all risks before permitting American gas exports. See, “Time Out” on LNG Exports Sought from Obama Administration, New York Times, Feb. 13, 2013 (available at http://www.lngworldnews.com)
 See Ebinger, supra note 31, at 9–10.
 See Comment #106, Yvette Colon, on behalf of Rick Bowen, President Energy, Alcoa.
 See Comment # 174, Peter A. Molinaro, Vice President, North America Government Affairs, The Dow Chemical Company.
 See Comment #323, Marnie Satterfield, on behalf of Paul N. Cicio, President, Industrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA).
 See Comment #106, Yvette Colon, on behalf of Rick Bowen, President Energy, Alcoa.
 See Comment #323, Marnie Satterfield, on behalf of Paul N. Cicio, President, Industrial Energy Consumers of America (IECA).
 See Comment # 20, U.S. Senator Ron Wyden (OR), Letter to U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Initial Comment on the LNG Export Study, Jan. 10, 2013 and Comment #6, U.S. Representative Edward Markey (Mass.), Letter to U.S. Department of Energy Secretary Steven Chu, Initial Comment on the LNG Export Study, Dec. 14, 2013
 See Sabine Pass DOE Order No. 2961 at p. 31.
 Applications Received by DOE to Export Domestically Produced LNG from the Lower-48 States (as of January 30, 2013), available at http://fossil.energy.gov/programs/gasregulation/reports/summary_lng_applications.pdf.
 The DOE’s full order can be found at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/05/f0/ord3282.pdf.
 Susan L. Sakmar, DOE Approves Third LNG Export Project to Non-FTA Countries, Natural Gas Europe (Aug. 8, 2013), available at http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/doe-approves-third-us-lng-export-project.
 Summary of LNG Export Applications, available at http://energy.gov/fe/downloads/summary-lng-export-applications
 Order NO. 3324 Conditionally Granting Long-Term Multi-Contract Authorization to Export Liquefied Natural Gas by Vessel From the Lake Charles Terminal to Non-Free Trade Agreement Nations, http://energy.gov/fe/downloads/fe-docket-no-11-59-lng.